PUDUKKOTTAI STATE

WAR INFORMATION BUREAU

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LECTURE XLIII.

# BURMA, SIAM & INDO-CHINA.

THE octopus of war, it can no longer be doubted, is beginning to spread its tentacles in the direction of India. Many of us have been watching Japan with an anxious eye, and now sinister developments are reported from Iraq and Iran, where Nazi agents have been known to have been at work for a considerable time past. A revolutionary Iraqi Government have opened the ball by splitting a few hairs over a treaty with Britain, about whose meaning and implications there could never have been any doubts in the minds of reasonable men. Once again the most solemn treaties become mere scraps of paper, according to the precept first promulgated in Germany in 1914, and faithfully followed at the present day both in the country of its origin and in other countries which have succumbed to its spell. Already clashes have occurred between the British and Iraqi forces at Habbaniyah and Basra. Rashid Ali has asked for German assistance, and another display of the tortuous Nazi technique that he had been suspected of adopting when he ousted the Regent from Baghdad is given to the world.

Hitler is now commonly supposed to be contemplating a "drive to the East." What form this drive will take is more than most observers can foretell, for it has been suggested with equal force both that a descent

upon EGYPT is his object or, alternatively, that he is after INDIA. But whatever his immediate plans and preoccupations, INDIA seems bound to come into the picture sooner or later, in all probability sooner rather than later, and that the East—near or far—is likely to be the next important theatre of war, any one with eyes can see. The stage is obviously being set.

In any such "drive to the East," Hitler, doubtless, counts upon the active collaboration of his Axis-partner JAPAN. The Japanese are clearing their decks for action. They have reached an agreement of sorts with their bugbear RUSSIA, by means of a non-aggression pact, guaranteed sound for five years. What it exactly means, how far it will be able to stand the strain of Japanese military and naval activity on the Chinese littoral, and Nazi thrusts in the direction of the DARDANELLES, which RUSSIA regards as her own exclusive waterway, time and chance alone can determine. For the moment, however, the pact leaves JAPAN free to proceed with her plans in other spheres besides North CHINA.

The Axis doubtless desire that simultaneously with anxieties arising from hostile action in IRAQ and IRAN, INDIA should have trouble on her eastern frontier. Their plans presumably are that JAPAN should march into BURMA by way of INDO-CHINA and SIAM or THAILAND, where the Japanese have found an excellent jumping-off ground. To run the gauntlet of the British fleet lying in and about SINGAPORE might not exactly suit the Japanese; hence an attempt to force a way into BURMA is more than likely.

BURMA, as we know, was part of INDIA until very recently. The preliminaries to separation from INDIA began in 1935, and separation itself actually took effect from the 1st of April 1937. The severance was not at all to INDIA's liking, nor for that matter to that of many in BURMA. The connection between the two peoples was a very old one, strengthened by cultural and commercial contacts which have benefited both countries. Still, when separation was decided on it was loyally accepted, and BURMA's new constitution, which is largely a replica of what was drawn up for INDIA, has been at work for four years now. We have the authority of Mr. Burton Leach that the Burmans are making quite a success of it, and a trade agreement has been recently concluded between BURMA and INDIA, on lines considered by

both parties to be eminently satisfactory. It is, however, worth remembering that BURMA and INDIA, geologically speaking, are one. The political separation brought about by Act of Parliament lost sight of this important fact. In the words of Sir Louis Leigh Fermor, "As one result, INDIA, from the geological point of view one of the most natural geological units on the surface of the earth, has lost a limb." The similarity of BURMA's geological formation to ours explains the presence of valuable minerals such as are found in INDIA. (Where, as for example in the SHAN states, geological formations are different, we find silver-lead deposits, tin and wolfram, the two latter serving geologically to link up TENASSERIM with the MALAY peninsula). Henceforward these useful resources can no longer be regarded as a common advantage to the Dominion and the Colony.

A large part of BURMA's war efforts must naturally be directed to the devolpment of her own resources, for almost all minerals have a military value. While certain minerals are valuable for subsidiary purposes, some are very necessary for armament-manufacture and for transport purposes. Wolfram, for instance, is essential for the manufacture of high-grade steel. BURMA teak, which has an outstanding reputation for quality, helps enormously in naval construction. She produces large quantities of aviation spirit. Burmese rice helps to sustain millions not only in BURMA but in INDIA and CEYLON. The most famous ruby-mines in the world are situated at MOGOK, and rubies are essential for chronometers, and for all instruments in which the greatest precision is required. Burmese tin-ore concentrates are used for smelting, and tin plate is used to manufacture alloys. Lead, of which BURMA has large deposits, is necessary for the manufacture of pipes, sheets, and foil and is valuable for artillery purposes.

It is thus clear that the industrial importance of BURMA is very considerable, and if the Axis or any partner of it is casting longing eyes in that direction it is understandable. But it can safely be predicted that BURMA will not easily yield to external aggression, for the Burmese are a proud people and have always valued their independence. At one time she was a subordinate kingdom owing allegiance to the Emperor of CHINA, but the distance from the Imperial capital, the difficult nature of the country itself, and the easy-going character of the Chinese, led to a gradual slackening of control, with the result that BURMA was virtually independent for many centuries. The Burmans

are now beginning to hark back to the days of their independence when they could boast of such rulers as Anawrahta and Kanzhitta, when the patronage of their kings and the piety of the people led to the blossoming of Burmese art and architecture. Naturally therefore the defence of their country is now being organised. Though the Burmese have no great military tradition, Burmese courage and indifference to death on the battle-field is attested to by those who have observed them in action. Recently a BURMA squadron of the Royal Air Force has been formed, and the squadron has for its crest BURMA's national emblem—"a peacock in its pride". It ought not to be difficult to form, equip and train an adequate supply of Burmese airmen to soar into the sky, and add the whir of their engines to the thunder whose reverberations provide the music to which peacocks are supposed to dance with delight.

## THE BURMA—YUNNAN ROAD.

Not long ago the BURMA Government set its hand to the making of a road between BURMA and the Chinese province of YUNNAN. The road starts at the railhead of LASHIO, and traverses a distance of about 700 miles of the most rugged country imaginable. It is a strategic asset to both countries, in that troops and supplies in quantity can be transported in both directions along this road, and as a matter of current fact it became a life-line of essential supplies to CHINA. In June 1940 the British Government, as a concession to strong Japanese sentiment, decided to close this road, a move which was greatly resented by the Indian public, who had always the liveliest affection for their Chinese neighbours, and greatly sympathised with their efforts to repel the Japanese aggressors. But when JAPAN showed no inclination whatever towards settlement with CHINA—the essential condition on which the road was closed—the British Government cancelled their original decision and reopened the road.

This was hailed with approval and satisfaction both in ENGLAND and INDIA, and of course, in BURMA, but its reopening has caused grave offence to JAPAN, and is undoubtedly one of the major causes at issue between JAPAN and the Allies, despite the fact that, in a manner of speaking, JAPAN asked for it.

There is a proposal to build a railway along this road, and if that should be done very great benefits must accrue to both BURMA and CHINA in the future, to say nothing of the immediate military possibilities.

## SIAM or THAILAND.

SIAM or THAILAND is about the size of FRANCE, and has been an independent kingdom since about the middle of the fourteenth century. More picturesque than internationally important until 1932, it then caught the fever of modern ideas and shed its mediaevalism. There was a semi-democratic revolution (of the mildest sort imaginable) in which the king of the time acquiesced, and later he abdicated in favour of his nephew, a boy called Ananda, during whose minority the State was run by three Regents. SIAM is not a rich country; it has a huge peasant population chronically in debt. But its finances, such as they are, are stable and sound.

SIAM has always prided herself on her neutrality, but geographically she occupies a strategic position between BURMA and SINGAPORE, and ENGLAND, FRANCE and JAPAN have for some time been interested in her foreign policy. There is a lot of British capital employed in developing the resources of SIAM, which consist mainly of rice, rubber and teak. Politically SIAM serves, or at any rate was regarded as serving, British interests by acting as a buffer between BURMA and the further East. Unlike their traditional attitude to BRITAIN, the Siamese are mortally afraid of the Japanese. They may smile and simper but they are deeply suspicious of Japanese intentions, and many resent the strong economic hold which JAPAN has on SIAM, and the fact that Japanese ships dominate BANGKOK harbour, which is being dredged and rebuilt by Japanese companies. Of late the Siamese radio has been German-controlled, so that the Axis hold on SIAM is something in the nature of a strangle-hold. The nucleus of the Siamese opposition to JAPAN, apart from British and American diplomacy, is provided by the powerful Chinese community in SIAM which numbers about two millions and a half.

The Isthmus of KRA, the narrow strip of land at the junction of SIAM and BURMA, has of late years provided considerable scope for speculation as to Japanese intentions. It has been suggested that the Japanese contemplated short-circuiting SINGAPORE by prevailing on

the THAILAND Government to cut a canal across the Isthmus. It is a picturesque project but it is difficult of accomplishment, and so far nothing is known of any inception of the actual plan.

In June 1940 a non-aggression pact was signed between BRITAIN, FRANCE and SIAM (which had by then taken the name of THAILAND). Meanwhile, the Japanese were insisting that the passage of arms and munitions to CHINA through French INDO-CHINA should stop, and to this the Pétain Government at Bordeaux subsequently agreed. But even without waiting for the French reply the Japanese army in southern CHINA proceeded to "cut off by force all supplies" to CHINA passing through INDO-CHINA. CHINA pointedly drew FRANCE'S attention to the violation of the Sino-French agreement of 1930 involved in the French acceptance of the Japanese demand, and the VICHY Government then informed CHUNGKING that FRANCE would resist should the Japanese assume an aggressive attitude towards INDO-CHINA. But it had become increasingly clear that what JAPAN was after was naval, military and air bases in INDO-CHINA, and permission to strike at CHINA by marching through French territory to YUNNAN.

Early in September, THAILAND herself came into the picture with a demand for the immediate cession of some Indo-Chinese border territory. It was patent that the demand was inspired by JAPAN, especially when the Siamese Government warned VICHY that, in the event of refusal, they would tear up their non-aggression pact with FRANCE. VICHY actually turned down the Siamese demand, and a good-will mission started from THAILAND with a view to establishing friendly relations between THAILAND and the British Empire. It is evident, however, that SIAM had not finally made up her mind as to the course she should take, for, at the same time that the good-will mission was on its way to INDIA, BURMA, MALAYA and AUSTRALIA, a parallel mission arrived in JAPAN.

Meanwhile clashes occurred on the INDO-CHINESE frontier between the French and the Thailanders, JAPAN openly encouraged SIAM in her demand for the territory west of the Mekong river, and relations between SIAM and French INDO-CHINA became tenser and tenser. In November there was considerable fighting along the Mekong, and JAPAN then promptly offered to arbitrate between SIAM and INDO-CHINA. She had her way, and with the cunning of a wolf in sheep's clothing, has succeeded in bringing about a so-called *rapproachement* between SIAM and INDO-CHINA.

The collapse of FRANCE in the west, the consequent emasculation of French power in her eastern colonies, and the successful angling of JAPAN in the troubled waters of the Mekong basin, have made the British sit up and take notice. They are obviously realising that they have carried the policy of conciliating JAPAN far beyond the safety limit, and as already noticed they have re-opened the BURMA-YUNNAN Road to Chinese supplies. The road is in an excellent state of repair, and capable of transporting enormous quantities of goods a day, and while its re-opening has produced the liveliest satisfaction in CHINA, the great speeding up of the traffic on this road has added enormously to the confusion of the Japanese.

## INDO-CHINA.

INDO-CHINA, as we know, has been French ever since the latter half of the nineteenth century. CHINA was then helpless, easy game for countries which had sufficient initiative to grab whatever territory they wanted. FRANCE came in quite early, and helped herself to COCHIN-CHINA and CAMBODIA without any leave asked. Later she bit off ANNAM, and consolidating all her acquisitions established herself securely in INDO-CHINA. The country is composed of five administrative divisions, all working in watertight compartments, for that is the French way. Affable and courtly in social affairs, in the matter of Government French gloves may have been velvet, but their hands were steel and they have put down strikes, etc., relentlessly, whenever they have occurred.

JAPAN naturally did not lag behind other countries in despoiling CHINA. But that did not help her to view French acquisitions in CHINA with a tolerant eye. She has always been suspicious of her French neighbour, and relations between the two countries have been throughout marked by a wary watchfulness on either side. The French have always been alive to the possibility of conflict with JAPAN, and wise in their generation, they had staved off Japanese economic penetration by a forbiddingly high tariff wall. But this could never quite obviate the chances of their coming up against them on the political issues, and sorely weakened and disjointed in the west as FRANCE is, that is exactly what has happened.

There is a French-owned narrow-gauge railway in INDO-CHINA, running from HAIPHONG and HANOI to YUNNANFU, the capital of the Chinese province of YUNNAN, which has always been regarded as a

French sphere of influence. This line of railway is one of the main arteries of trade with CHINA, and a valuable source of Chinese shipments. Relations between the two countries were subjected to a severe strain in 1939, when JAPAN seized the island of HAINAN. The French, greatly incensed, speeded up supplies by their railway, which they declined to close despite Japanese pressure. JAPAN clenched her teeth and bided her time, and that looked-for time came when FRANCE collapsed in the west.

This then is the position to the immediate east of INDIA. Dull-witted optimists imagine that JAPAN will not or cannot strike, but JAPAN is getting into the habit of getting drunk by deputy! Nazi successes in the west have gone to JAPAN's head, and until she actually measures her strength with the Allied forces in the Pacific, she is not likely to come down to the earth again. In this state of affairs it is very comforting to have the assurance of Air Marshal Sir Victor Brooke-Popham, the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in the East based on the great stronghold of SINGAPORE, who recently said "We shall never stop improving MALAYA's defences. I am not going to sleep, nor shall I let anybody else sleep. Even as the defences stand to-day, we should put up a jolly good show against anybody, and I am perfectly confident we should win."

Whatever their apparent temporary advantages, it surely behoves Japanese jingoes to mark this utterance, coming as it does so shortly after pregnant statements from leading Ministers in AUSTRALIA and AMERICA, to show the extent to which their countries too are interested in the *status quo* of the lands forming the subject of this paper.

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# WEEKLY WAR SUMMARY.

## 30—4—41 to 7—5—41.

**Trouble in Iraq.**—It is now clear that when Rashid Ali seized power and publicly declared his intention to respect the Anglo-Iraq Alliance, and even allowed the first contingent of troops to land in BASRA, he was only playing for time and harbouring treachery. For when fresh British forces arrived he objected to their landing, on the ground that the previous contingent had not left. When, under the treaty rights, these fresh contingents *were* landed Rashid Ali concentrated his troops round the adjacent aerodrome of HABBANIYAH, and would not only not withdraw but opened fire; whereupon the British had to reply. Clashes have also occurred in BASRA, ending in the expulsion of the Iraqi forces. Rashid Ali is reported to have applied to GERMANY for help.

The importance of IRAQ lies in its extensive oil fields and its proximity to SUEZ.

**The Balkans.**—In the BALKANS the evacuation of the Allied forces has been completed, with amazingly little loss, thanks to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force.

By parachute and aircraft the Germans have effected landings in MYTILENE and CHIOS. Italians claim to have occupied the IONIAN ISLANDS of CEPHALONIA, ZANTE and LEUCAS.

**Abyssinia.**—BAHRBAR, DEBUB and WALDIA have been occupied.

**Libya.**—Although according to earlier reports the enemy was said to have penetrated the outer defences of TOBRUK, later accounts show that the attack has finally proved abortive and been brought to a standstill. The set-back is a heavy blow to the German preparations for an advance on EGYPT. TOBRUK blocks the coastal road from BENGHAZI to SOLLUM.

**Far-East.**—(1) Chinese forces are reported to have reoccupied WENCHOW and HAIMEN in CHEKIANG Province which the Japanese occupied two weeks ago.

(2) The present infiltration of JAPAN into THAILAND is said to be like that into the BALKAN countries prior to German invasion.

(3) Two economic agreements concerning INDO-CHINA are nearing completion between JAPAN and FRANCE, one concerning the rights of navigation and residence, and the other about tariffs and trade-payments.

**Air-Raids.**—In spite of unfavourable weather the R. A. F. carried out attacks on KIEL and the BERLIN area, the U-boat base at DEN HELDER, the docks at BREST and the shipping off the Dutch Coast.

During the week, German aircraft raided PLYMOUTH, LIVERPOOL and BELFAST (Northern IRELAND).

**America.**—(1) 50 Oil-tankers will be placed in special service in a few days by the U. S. Maritime Commission in aid of the British.

(2) It is believed that freighters which left AMERICA early in April with supplies to GREECE and YUGOSLAVIA have now reached SUEZ.

(3) A statement signed by 17 prominent American military and naval authorities showing why BRITAIN should win the war has been issued. The reasons given are:—(1) that GERMANY has no access to essential war materials over-seas; (2) that the German Industrial plants are within reach of the R. A. F., while BRITAIN can draw freely from her Dominions and AMERICA, besides using her own immense production; (3) that in the decisive War Zone which is the Atlantic BRITAIN has the command and (4) that the U. S. Navy which may enter the arena at any time is a factor in BRITAIN's favour.

There is also the American will to help.

In a popular magazine, '*Colliers Weekly*' Mr. Wendell Willkie has written:—

"We should furnish BRITAIN with ships, ships in our docks and coastwise trade, as well as impounded ships of other nations, ships we are building, ships until it hurts. Give BRITAIN destroyers, and if necessary convoy the production of our factories and farms, so that ENGLAND will survive. The combined production of ENGLAND,

AMERICA, CANADA and AUSTRALIA would give air superiority in 1942-43, when the peoples of the conquered countries, perhaps even the enslaved Germans, will arise."

Of even greater importance is President Roosevelt's latest pronouncement that '**Americans are ever ready to fight for Democracy**'. Speaking at the dedication of Woodrow Wilson's birth-place as a National Shrine, President Roosevelt declared that democracy is a faith for which AMERICA has fought before and would fight again. Democracy could not survive in isolation. He added that democracy would emerge triumphant from the conflict. All recorded history bears witness to the fact that people who rely on the sword have perished by the sword.

**Hitler's Speech.**—Hitler's speech delivered at the Reichstag on May 4 has attracted very little attention. It was cast in a minor key, without mention of his recent BALKAN 'Victories'. It contained no doubt the old stories of the faithlessness of democracies, and abounded in abuse of Mr. Churchill. The Italian reverses he said were 'temporary', but ITALY would have her share in the booty owing to 'her great sacrifices in blood' for the Axis cause. The Reich, he added, had no territorial or political interest in the BALKANS, beyond building up close economic relations with them as business partners.

Contrast with all this hideous lying and bombast Mr. Menzies' remarkable tribute to the British nation in a broadcast on the same day. He stated :—

"If someone asked me to say quickly what my outstanding impression of Britain to-day is, I would think of many things—Mr. Winston Churchill, the resolute and supremely eloquent embodiment of the British fighting spirit, the splendid boys in blue of the R. A. F, the factories, surrounded in some cases by the workpeoples' shattered homes, roaring out their busy answer to the enemy—but above all of Britain's women.

"It is possible that not long ago we thought of them as the weaker sex, in the passive role of 'men must work and women must weep.' But what do we find now?

"Women conducting a vast war organisation with conspicuous success, and also achieving amazing marvels in war workshops.

"It marks the beginning of a new era, which will usher in enormous social and other changes, about which we can only speculate.

"From the Queen, whose cheerful, brave smile has brought comfort to thousands of people in the wrecked homes, down to the humblest women of the East End, the breed runs.

"The next generation in Britain may have mothers who have forgotten how to swoon in most times of crisis, who no longer cling to man as ivy to a wall, who commit the immodesty of wearing those hideous garments which have long been man's gloom, glory and prerogative, who find no inconsistency between lipstick on their face and axle grease on their hands,—but they will be mothers of men.

"The enemy had abandoned the old chivalries which gave a certain decency and dignity to a battle.

"He had done his best to breed hate in the hearts of millions of British people who entered the war without hate.

"The present war was not fought with soldier against soldier but with bomb and mine against women, old men and children.

"*The enemy had reincarnated the worst barbarism of the past, and had with sickening hypocrisy sought to glorify it as the new order for which the world had waited.*

"Our task, is not to overthrow one man, but to scourge out of the German nation the foul spirit which has possessed them for generations.

"*The battle for civilisation is on.*"

## R.A.F. Raids over ENEMY and ENEMY-occupied Territories.

| Date. | Targets. | R. A. F. losses. | Enemy aircraft losses and results of air bombardment. |
|---|---|---|---|
| **28—4—41. (Monday).** | | | |
| **DAY :—** | **GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.** | | |
| | **EMDEN** ... ... ... | ... | Heavily damaged. |
| | **Offensive patrols** over the other side of the ENGLISH CHANNEL. **Two enemy destroyers** off the DUTCH coast. | 4 planes. | 1 vessel sunk. 1 plane. |

| Date | Targets. | R. A. F. losses. | Enemy aircraft losses and results of air bombardment. |
|---|---|---|---|
| **28—4—41.** | **(Monday)**—*cont.* | | |
| | **GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE**—*cont.* | | |
| | **A factory and railway yards** at MOPPEL. **Docks** at DEN HELDER ... **Aerodrome** at DE KOOY ... | 1 plane. | Damaged. |
| | **NIGHT :—** | | |
| | **The Naval Base and the two GERMAN battleships GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST** at BREST. | No loss. | Heavy damage. |
| | **ITALIAN AFRICA.** | | |
| | **Aerodrome** at BENGHAZI ... | ... | 1 plane shot down; many others damaged. Heavy casualties. |
| | **Enemy aircraft** in GIMMA aerodrome | ... | Many damaged. |
| | **Motor transport concentrations** between BATIE and CANDEHO. | ... | Heavy loss. |
| | **Enemy positions and trenches** in CHILGA area. | | |
| **29—4—41.** | **(Tuesday.)** | | |
| | **GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.** | | |
| | **DAY :—** | | |
| | **Supply ships** off the coasts of BELGIUM, FRANCE and NORWAY. | 3 planes. | 5 ships sunk and many others damaged. |
| | **NIGHT :—** | | |
| | **Three enemy aerodromes** in Northern FRANCE. | ... | 1 plane damaged. |
| | **The town and the docks** at MANNHEIM | ... | Large fires started. |
| | **Extensive oil stores** at ROTTERDAM ... | ... | Set on fire. |
| | **ITALIAN AFRICA.** | | |
| | **Enemy planes on the ground** at BENINA and DERNA. | ... | Many planes damaged. |
| | **The harbour** at BENGHAZI ... | ... | ... |
| | **Aerial fight** over TOBRUK ... | ... | 3 planes. |
| | **Motor transport, ammunition dumps and troop positions** in ABYSSINIA. | ... | Heavy casualties to white and native troops. |
| | **Buildings** at SIFANI and TANDESO aerodrome. | 4 planes. | Buildings crashed. |

| Date. | Targets. | R. A. F. losses. | Enemy aircraft losses and results of air bombardment. |
|---|---|---|---|
| **30—4—41.** | **(Wednesday).** | | |
| | **GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.** | | |
| | **DAY :—** | | |
| | **Shipping** off the DUTCH coast ... | ... | Many damaged. |
| | **A wireless station** on an Island off the NORWEGIAN coast. | 1 plane | Put out of action. |
| | **NIGHT :—** | | |
| | **BERLIN** (capital of GERMANY) ... | ... | Heavily damaged. |
| | **The Industrial centre** of HAMBURG ... | ... | ... |
| | **The port** of EMDEN ... | No loss. | ... |
| | **ITALIAN AFRICA.** | | |
| | **Enemy troops and motor transport** in CYRENAICA. | ... | ... |
| | **Motor transport** in the GAMBUT area. | ... | 100 vehicles damaged. |
| | **Aerial fight** over SOFAFI ... | ... | 3 planes. |
| | **Motor transport** in the SCIASCIAMANNA area and ASSAB. | ... | Considerable damage and casualties caused. |
| | **An enemy camp** north of MAJI ... | ... | ... |
| **1—5—41.** | **(Thursday).** | | |
| | **GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.** | | |
| | **DAY :—** | | |
| | **The GERMAN submarine base, German troops, a power station, barracks and buildings** at DEN HELDER. | ... | Heavy damage and casualties. Fires started. |
| | **German troops** on the Island of TEXEL. | ... | ... |
| | **Oil storage tanks** at VLAARDINGEN... | ... | Set on fire. |
| | **Enemy shipping** off the DUTCH coast. | 1 plane. | 1 Oil-tanker hit. |
| | **NIGHT :—** | | |
| | **The Docks** at BREST ... | No loss. | Heavily damaged. |
| | **ITALIAN AFRICA.** | | |
| | **Enemy transport and troops** in the ACROMA area (near TOBRUK). | ... | Heavy loss and casualties. |
| | **Aerial fight** over TOBRUK area ... | ... | 3 planes. |
| | **Enemy positions and communications** in CYRENAICA. | ... | ... |
| | **The harbour and other military objectives** at BENGHAZI. | ... | One vessel set on fire. Ammunition dump blown up. |
| | **The aerodrome** at BENINA ... | ... | ... |
| | **Enemy positions** at AMBA ALAGI and near ALOMATA. | ... | ... |
| | **An Enemy fortress** in the pass of FALAG. | 1 plane. | Demolished. |

| Date. | Targets. | R. A. F. losses. | Enemy aircraft losses and results of air bombardment. |
|---|---|---|---|
| **2—5—41. (Friday).** | | | |
| | **GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.** | | |
| **DAY :—** | | | |
| | **Two enemy supply ships** off the DUTCH coast. | ... | 1 ship (5,000 tons) sunk. |
| **NIGHT :—** | | | |
| | **The Docks and the Industrial areas** in HAMBURG. | ... | Heavily damaged. |
| | **The Docks** at EMDEN ... ... | ... | ... |
| | **Oil stores** at ROTTERDAM ... | 4 planes. | ... |
| | **ITALIAN AFRICA.** | | |
| | **Aerodromes** in CYRENAICA ... | ... | Damaged. |
| **3—5—41. (Saturday.)** | | | |
| | **GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.** | | |
| | **Industrial centre** of COLOGNE ... | | |
| | **Nazi battle cruisers GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST** at BREST. | ... | Large fires started. |
| | **Docks** at CHERBOURG and BOULOGNE | | |
| | **The Aerodrome** at LE TOUQUET ... | | |
| | **Oil storage tanks** at ROTTERDAM ... | ... | Set on fire. |
| | **Oil tanks and an aerodrome** in Southern NORWAY. | ... | Damaged. |
| | **ESSEN and DUSSELDORF** ... | | |
| | **ITALIAN AFRICA.** | | |
| | **The aerodrome** at BENINA ... | | |
| | **Military objectives** in BENGHAZI ... | | |
| | **Support to British ground forces** in AMBA ALAGI and FRAGAPASS areas in ABYSSINIA. | ... | Heavy casualties and damage caused. |
| | **MEDITERRANEAN.** | | |
| | **Enemy merchantships** in the MEDITERRANEAN. | | |
| | **IRAQ.** | | |
| | **Aircraft on the ground and military buildings** at the IRAQI aerodrome outside BAGDAD. | ... | Many planes on the ground damaged. |
| | **The aerodrome** at HABBANIYAH. | | |

## ENEMY Raids over BRITAIN and BRITISH Territories.

| Date. | Targets. | Enemy aircraft losses. | R. A. F. losses and results of air bombardment. |
|---|---|---|---|
| **29—4—41. (Tuesday).** | | | |
| | **BRITAIN.** | | |
| **NIGHT :—** | | | |
| | PLYMOUTH ... | 10 planes. | Damage and casualties heavy. |
| | **Points** in the South-west and Southern ENGLAND, East ANGLIA and South WALES. | | Casualties heavy. |
| | **MEDITERRANEAN.** | | |
| | **MALTA** ... | ... | Slight damage to civilian property. |
| **30—4—41. (Wednesday).** | | | |
| | **BRITAIN.** | | |
| **DAY :—** | | | |
| | No air activity. | | |
| **NIGHT :—** | | | |
| | North-east coast of ENGLAND ... | 1 plane. | No damage. |
| | **MEDITERRANEAN.** | | |
| | **MALTA** ... | ... | Slight damage. |
| **1—5—41. (Thursday).** | | | |
| | **BRITAIN.** | | |
| **DAY :—** | | | |
| | **One point** on the South coast ... | ... | Casualties small. |
| **NIGHT :—** | | | |
| | MERSEYSIDE ...<br>**A town** in Western ENGLAND ...<br>**A few other places** in ENGLAND ... | 1 plane. | Damage slight.<br>... |
| | **EGYPT.** | | |
| | **ALEXANDRIA** ... | ... | No bombs dropped. |
| **2—5—41. (Friday.)** | | | |
| | **BRITAIN.** | | |
| **NIGHT :—** | | | |
| | MERSEYSIDE ...<br>**A town** in East ANGLIA ...<br>**Many dispersed places** here and there in ENGLAND. | 5 planes. | Heavy damage.<br>Only slight damage. |

| Date. | Targets. | Enemy aircraft losses. | R. A. F. losses and results of air bombardment. |
|---|---|---|---|
| **3—5—41. (Saturday).** | | | |
| | **BRITAIN.** | | |
| **DAY :—** | | | |
| | South-east and South-west coasts of ENGLAND. | ... | Little damage. |
| | KENT ... | 1 plane. | ... |
| **NIGHT :—** | | | |
| | MERSEYSIDE, LIVERPOOL and a **few other places** in ENGLAND. | 16 planes. | Casualties and damage heavy. |
| | **MEDITERRANEAN.** | | |
| | **MALTA** ... | ... | A few people killed. |
| **4—5—41. (Sunday.)** | | | |
| | **BRITAIN.** | | |
| **NIGHT :—** | | | |
| | MERSEYSIDE ... | ... | ... |
| | **Many points** in North-west ENGLAND. | ... | ... |
| | **BELFAST** (N. IRELAND) ... | ... | ... |

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# SIDE LIGHTS.

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**THE FINGER ON THE SPOT.** The other day I listened to a small crowd of educated men, not all British, discussing the more recent developments of the war. Everybody gave Hitler a chit over the efficiency of his war-machine—even of his Fifth Column ; and no one tried to minimise the immediate or near-future results of his successful rampaging in the BALKANS. But the onlooker could not help being struck by the unexcited, confident tone of the discussion. There was no fearful prognostication, no apportioning of blame, no sign whatever of any lessening of a unspoken conviction that the end of every thing would be victory, complete and absolute, for BRITAIN and her Allies. Then some one said "In war, the Moral is to the Material as three is to one......but who the hell said it, I can't remember !" Nor could anyone else there find the source of that pregnant and invincible quotation. Guesses varied between Napoleon,

Clausewitz and Von Moltke (and various other people who knew the business of war), and though the truth has not even yet been ascertained, it doesn't matter much, because whoever said it undoubtedly put his finger right on the spot.

*    *    *    *

**LIBYAN SUMMARY.** A powerful enemy army has been halted—for some significant time—on the borders of EGYPT, having swept back over a couple of hundred miles of desert territory recently the scene of a series of Allied victories over the Italians

**WHY?** Because they were undoubtedly overwhelmingly superior in strength, with their German tanks, armoured cars, and motor cycle troops, supported by lorry-borne infantry and artillery which may be either mainly German or mainly Italian.

**HOW?** We have already suggested in these columns how so elaborately-equipped a German army got there. The narrowness of the water between SICILY and TUNISIA, and the fainéant attitude of the French authorities towards hostile use of their territorial waters and perhaps even their ports, made it comparatively easy for the Germans to employ troopships by night, in spite of onr Mediterranean Fleet.

The other 'How?'—namely the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy is again easily explained by the necessity we accepted with such good grace and gallant results, namely the succour of GREECE.

**WHITHER ?** If it were yet certain—which it is not—that the enemy will attempt to overrun EGYPT—here are some factors with which he will have to cope :—

(a) Empire Forces on the Egyptian Frontier are being rapidly reinforced from the victorious armies in ERITREA and ABYSSINIA, and can make full use of Wavell's earlier fortified lines. There are more TOBRUKS than one round about there !

(b) The enemy has undoubtedly come up against strong British forces, while he is exposed to sea bombardment as well.

(c) The enemy has had enough difficulty already in bringing up his supplies thus far, by air. He'll want a *great many more* squadrons before he can genuinely invade EGYPT. By sea, his supply-ships will have an extremely hazardous job of work ! Yet as he faces really

strong resistance, those supplies must be rushed up in never ending streams, from the nearest possible base. TRIPOLI, where they now set out from, is under the tender attention of the R.A.F. BENGHAZI, the nearer base, is even more exposed to those attentions.

(*d*) Not only is the enemy's left flank exposed to attack from the sea, but his right flank also, thanks to our occupation of JARABUB and SIWA in the south, will have to watch its step.

(*e*) These considerations affect the Germans adversely whether they do intend to invade, or whether their object is merely to contain important British forces; but in connection with the former possibility, it may also be remembered that the first attempt (of Graziani's) involved a simultaneous subsidiary invasion,—from Italian East AFRICA *via* the SUDAN,—and that is now definitely out of the question.

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**THE MOLOTOV-MATSUOKA EMBRACE.** The papers treated us recently to a touching description of a public embrace by these two leading statesmen, on the occasion of Mr. Matsuoka's departure from MOSCOW after the signing of the Russo-Japanese Pact on April 13th. We wonder which of the two would have given most for Shivaji's famous 'claws'!

The terms of the Pact have been widely published. Let us merely examine the implications. Setting aside opinions varying as widely as Prince Konoye's "a treaty of epoch-making significance," and Mr. Sol Bloom's "just another of those treaties", the essence of the matter seems to be that JAPAN can move in the south-east without fear of RUSSIA'S attacking MANCHUKUO from the north; and that if RUSSIA wants to concentrate in the west, she need not worry about JAPAN interfering in the Republic of Outer MONGOLIA.

There can be little doubt as to which is the more important of the two safeguards. For centuries, RUSSIA has had two major policies, in the West and in the East. She has never abandoned either since the time of Peter the Great—but she has often put one on ice, in favour temporarily of the other. This is what she has done with her present eastern policy, because she does not like the look of Hitler at the moment, not because she has anything serious to fear from JAPAN. On the other hand JAPAN CAN NOT move in the south with a restive RUSSIA on the north, and she may HAVE to move in the

south (under the Axis whip). In short, both sides are temporarily suited by the Pact, but RUSSIA'S NEED being less than JAPAN'S she has got the best of the bargain, and RUSSIA is at worst not an open enemy of BRITAIN's.

* * * *

**N. E. I.** These are important capital letters, and will become more important. They stand for a group of large and small islands known to geography as the MALAY ARCHIPELAGO, to history as the SPICE ISLANDS, and to modern politics as the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Their population is 70,000,000 (the majority inhabiting Java), they have great natural economic resources, and they occupy a position on the globe which is of tremendous strategic importance. It is these latter two aspects that will occupy us shortly here, but it is also of interest to record that the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES have very close links with INDIA. Their culture, epic, legend and art, as well as much of their thought and domestic custom has been greatly influenced from INDIA, while a million tons of sugar a year coming to INDIA from MALAYA and increasing quantities of steel, cotton and textiles to the N. E. I. from INDIA, obviously constitute another strong link. Now for the greater considerations:—

**Economic.** (i) The N. E. I. (with British MALAYA) possess a virtual monopoly of RUBBER—hence deep American interest.

(ii) They produce 7,500,000 metric tons of CRUDE OIL, to say nothing of being the world's second largest exporters of CANE SUGAR, and of large quantities of TEA, PALM OIL, TOBACCO, QUININE and SPICES.

(iii) They also produce BAUXITE—a familiar enough word in war-economics.

(iv) Her potential resources are known to be far greater than her developed industries.

**Strategic.** (i) They are the link between the Far East and the rest of Southern ASIA, including INDIA.

(ii) They are the junction for trade routes branching out to CHINA, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, AMERICA and to INDIA, the MIDDLE EAST and EUROPE itself.

(iii) The only attempts to find other routes have been the Siberian Railway, and the BURMA road. The uses of both these routes are strictly limited and both are uneconomic compared with the sea routes.

(iv) It is therefore not too much to say that the *Power controlling the N. E. I. controls the whole commerce of the Indian Ocean, the Far East and AUSTRALIA.*

* * * *

**GREEDY EYES.** There is common agreement in both hemispheres that the primary object of JAPAN'S present southward drive is the N. E. I. She has made no secret of the fact that she would like to control them, and though circumstances have so far caused her several 'losses of face' in pursuit of that aim, the recent Pact with RUSSIA will have given the Yellow Jingoes a tonic draught.

Her essential objects are:—

(*a*) to obtain the supplies of rubber, oil and bauxite which she lacks;

(*b*) to obtain markets for her manufactured goods;

(*c*) to obtain living space for her surplus population;

(*d*) to obtain an open field of exploitation for her rich and exclusive merchant firms and

(*e*) to DOMINATE THE TRADE OF THE INDIAN AND WEST PACIFIC OCEANS.

*This she would have done long ago except for* (*i*) *the great British fortress of SINGAPORE,* and (*ii*) *the Dutch alliance with Britain.*

JAPAN has already made three attempts—

in early 1940 when GERMANY attacked HOLLAND, a Nazi seizure of the N. E. I. was attempted, but failed.

later in the same year, when the N. E. I. were invited to join JAPAN'S co-prosperity sphere (which meant sending large supplies of rubber and oil to JAPAN!).

in February this year, when with roarings and threats, the wildest demands for mining and fishing-rights, and for free entry of Japanese exploiters, were made direct to the N. E. I., deliberately ignoring the LONDON Dutch Government. (cf. GERMANY and CZECHOSLOVAKIA).

The reactions of interested Powers were prompt. The Australian War Council, on February 13, declared a "situation of the utmost gravity". President Roosevelt told Admiral Nomura that aid to Britain would continue "even if AMERICA should be dragged into a Pacific War". British reinforcements promptly reached SINGAPORE, and Australian troops followed on February 19th.

**Result.** In the last month or so, JAPAN has reverted to ordinary commercial relations and has been profuse in her protestations of friendship. Meanwhile, two important Dutch Ministers, Dr. Van Cliffens and M. Walter have gone to the N. E. I., *visiting Washington on their way.*

# WHAT THE FRENCH FEEL.

## "GENEROSITY" OF GERMAN CONQUERORS.

## ATTITUDE OF THE QUISLINGS AND THE PEOPLE.

by

*Colin Coote (In a recent B. B. C. talk).*

WHATEVER may have been the reason for the collapse of France last summer, there can be no dispute about the collapse. France experienced a complete and catastrophic military defeat. In a total war, there are only three possible results—total victory, stalemate, (which can only be an interlude), or total defeat, France got the total defeat.

The only cards left to her were the French Fleet and the French Empire. Would she play them? Or would she throw them into the pile of discards, to be cowed by the enemy?

The doubt was responsible for the tragedy of Oran, when we put out of action part of the main French Mediterranean squadron. We can be very sure that this action would not have been taken if any alternative had, at the time, seemed possible, and if many alternatives had not, in fact, been tried.

So there was of course, never any doubt, least of all in the minds of those who gave the orders, that the result would be another and an embittering shock to the French people. They were never allowed to hear anything about Oran, except the fact that French ships had been sunk, and Frenchmen killed by the British.

The Germans at once placarded the country with posters, "Remember Oran". It says much for the intelligence of the people that by night the final word was torn off, and instead of "Remember Oran" they read only "Remember".

The consequences of defeat extended far further than the shilly-shallying which precipitated the affair of Oran. The blackest streak in the background of the French scene is the retention of 1½ million French prisoners in Germany.

These men are not only potential fighting men of France, but potential fathers and potential workers. They are hostages, whose retention marks the deliberate German plan to cripple France now and in the future.

An even more obvious consequence of defeat, is the physical occupation by the enemy of practically the whole of the richest part of France, and of the whole Atlantic seaboard. It is not difficult to imagine how this position impedes the attempts to restore any sort of economic life, and still more, attempts to restore the national spirit.

There is another fact that I want to put into my background. I often see in our papers over here, labels

attached to Frenchmen saying that so and so is pro-British, or anti-British. Believe me, that isn't the proper criterion.

They should be judged by whether or not they are pro-French or anti-French—it comes to the same thing in the end, because in the end, if they are pro-French, they will be pro-British whether they like it or not.

Now let us come to the main picture. In what is happening in France there are curious contradictions. For example, the real French Quislings, Laval and company, tried to start a new party. It was a great chance of sucking up to the German bully.

The party was formed right under the German aegis, but it appears that only 15,000 adherents could be scraped together. No other cause could have attracted so few people.

Again, last year Marshal Pétain abruptly sacked Laval, who fled for comfort and restoration to his German friends. They have not yet succeeded in forcing him back. That is one aspect of the case.

A procession of rather dismal ghosts passed through some of the chief offices of state, until Admiral Darlan appeared as a kind of universal minister, holding most of these offices simultaneously, and Admiral Darlan rushes to and fro between Vichy and Paris, seeming to edge nearer and nearer towards real co-operation with the enemy.

He allows Germans to take the place of, or to supplement the Italians on the Armistice Commissions in the French Empire, and he says in public that the Germans show more generosity than the British, because the Germans restored a fraction of the food that they have stolen from France, whereas the British applied their blockade to France.

In point of fact, the Germans have restored nothing, they have merely agreed to an exchange of goods between the two parts of France. The German controlled press in Paris, is claiming that Admiral Darlan is carrying out Laval's policy—only three months later than Laval wanted to begin.

I have not the slightest doubt that that ambitious man has decided, for the time being, that the only way to get on is to co-operate with their German masters. How much that corresponds with their inclinations is more doubtful, but it is quite certain that their attitude does not correspond with the inclinations that any strong enough, or humble enough would be able to express, and that there is a striking contrast between the views of the genuine co-operators in the Vichy Government, and the views of the people.

With regard to Marshal Pétain, his attitude, so far as one can judge, is that having signed the Armistice, he will stick to the letter of the terms, and he will consent to such measures of economic co-operation as may ease the condition of the people, but that he will not co-operate politically with a belligerent Germany, if only because that would renew the bloodshed which he signed the Armistice to stop.

Whether he will be able to stick to that attitude is doubtful. There are two main dangers which he has to face. The first is German impatience, which would certainly rise to frenzy if things started going badly for the Germans, and the second is the ambition, the vindictiveness, or just the plain folly, of some of his own colleagues. There are, however, counters to both these dangers.

To German impatience can be opposed in the last resort the cards of the French fleet and of the French Empire, **neither of which, thanks by the way to the British, the Germans can seize.** I think this explains why the Germans have kept their pressure so far more or less behind the scenes, and the counter to the French Quislings is the French people.

Let us see for a moment what this people are doing, and what is being done to them. A good deal of evidence is available from letters and from people trickling out of France, and what I have to say is based mainly on that evidence.

In the first place, the German attempts to conciliate the French by good behaviour have not succeeded. The burgler has been polite, but he has burgled on a tremendous scale; the cost of the German occupation of France is running at the rate of £827,000,000 per annum, about twice the whole French pre-war budget, and more than three times the amount which Germany was asked to pay in reparation, under the Young Plan and which she said she could not pay without largely increased exports.

But the French can't pay anything out of an export surplus, because the exports which they had to make are tribute, not trade, and they are not allowed to keep even imports into Unoccupied France, for the German and Italian commissions at the ports leave them only a fraction of the cargoes.

The only cargoes which go wholly to the French are those such as the two ship-loads of flour which we have arranged to allow through the blockade, which are distributed under American auspices in Unoccupied France. It is probably true that, thanks to German depredations and to the extremely poor harvest in France last year, supplies are running short in France, and that there is heavy unemployment.

This leads to a further form of German pressure, namely the allocation of raw materials to French factories on condition that they are turned into goods for Germany. No doubt this economic subservience was not foreseen by those who hustled or were hustled into an Armistice. The consequences of defeat by Germany are rarely foreseen until the defeat takes place—they seem incredible until they happen. Nobody should ever forget that.

So much for the German generosity of which Admiral Darlan spoke. There is direct evidence that the people understand the truth even if he does not. In the second place there is evidence that the French in Occupied France, do not resent the bombing of German-occupied

ports. They jeer at the Germans (They say "The sea-green undesirables") for not being able to prevent these attacks.

They cheer our aeroplanes on their daylight sweeps—there is not one person, French or British, who has escaped from France since the Armistice, who has not a tale to tell of help given, and of great risks run to give that help. There is not a letter that does not tell in frank or guarded language of sacrifices cheerfully borne, in the hope and because of the hope of our victory. These letters are, of course, only a trickle, and I daresay there are Frenchmen who have other ideas.

When one is smarting under defeat, and when one may have a suspicion that those who decided to continue the resistance were right, mental processes sometimes become very tortuous—nobody likes admitting that they must owe their salvation to someone else. And the enemy loses no chance, by suppression and by distortion, of creating in France dislike and contempt for the British.

Nevertheless there are certain facts which the enemy cannot hide, and the chief among them is that we are not beaten, but striking back harder and harder, so that I think that the hopelessness in France, bred of the suspicion that our defeat must follow hers, is departing, and passing much more rapidly among the people than among their leaders.

But don't expect too much. There may be hidden arms, and there are brave people in France, but the arms cannot appear, and the people cannot act until the stranglehold of the enemy is relaxed.

Remember the counsel of Mr. Churchill, in that penetrating broadcast which he delivered to the French people last October: "Sleep", he said—mark the choice of the word—"Sleep, and gather strength for the morning, for the morning will come."

Come it will, and when it comes, the black shadows of those who have conquered France and who have betrayed France, will fade away.

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# DISLOCATION OF ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS. IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE OF BRITISH OFFENSIVE.

# R. A. F. ATTACKS ON CANALS AND RAILWAYS.

by

*Wing Commander L. V. Fraser.*

MODERN armies cannot "live on the country." Any mechanised force must draw steadily and regularly on supplies of all kinds.

This makes dislocation of enemy communications one of the most important objectives of the British offensive. Immediate results are not always obvious, and may not seem so spectacular as when a great war factory is gutted or stocks of raw materials are sent sky high, but though these are important targets communications are vital.

In order of importance German communications are canals, railways, roads, the sea and the air. Unlike Britain, Germany has an intricate and **extensive canal system, which handles the bulk of heavy and non-perishable goods traffic**. Canals and waterways are linked with great rivers, and converge on large inland ports.

The Duisburg Ruhr port is the largest river port in the world, serving the junction of the Rhine, Ruhr, Ems and Weser by way of the Dortmund Ems canal and Mittelland canal. More than 40,000 barges are accommodated in an average year. The R. A. F. has bombed this port 39 times so far.

Where the canals are across valleys they are often carried by aqueducts rather than a series of locks. This is cheaper and makes for less delay. The Dortmund Ems canal has three aqueducts which carry it across the rivers Lippe, Stever and Ems. The largest of the three is the double aqueduct across the Ems. This canal system is necessarily of great strategic importance and has been heavily attacked by British bombers.

## DORTMUND EMS CANAL A VITAL LINK.

The Dortmund Ems Canal is a vital link between east and west. Should Germany seek to transfer her heavy industries from the Ruhr to supposedly safer areas, the Canal would become still more important in proportion to the greater quantities of material which would be waterborne.

The attack by the R. A. F. on this nerve centre was carefully considered and as carefully carried out. It was made on a bright moonlight night and bombs were dropped both in the aqueduct near the stop-gate and on the

embankment. Subsequent reconnaissance showed barges lying high and dry in the mud with the aqueduct empty. The barges were being unloaded in the fields alongside the canal.

Canals and railways are interdependent. When either system suffers, additional strain is put on the other. **Damage to the canals slows down railways; damage to the railway congests the canals**.

Natural conditions have imposed on German railway transport certain disadvantages in wartime. This is partly due to geographical considerations and partly to an imposed system, designed to increase co-ordination, which has brought increased vulnerability. A number of bottlenecks in distribution has been created.

## HAMM MARSHALLING YARD.

The marshalling yard at Hamm is an east-west link as essential for rail traffic as is the Dortmund Ems canal for waterborne traffic. Traffic east and north bound from the Ruhr must also pass through it.

The function of marshalling yards is to sort out incoming trucks and make up train loads: no loading or unloading takes place. Speed in handling is essential, and at Hamm the Germans devised elaborate mechanical methods, which worked so well in normal times that marshalling work previously done elsewhere was transferred thither. Money and time were saved, **but with so many eggs in one basket vulnerability was increased.** Even slight damage may involve long delays in clearing traffic. Rolling stocks are likely to be destroyed and tracks themselves cut.

The opportunity has not been lost by the R. A. F. Hamm has been attacked oftener than any other target in Germany. Similar targets have been attacked elsewhere in Germany.

Berlin is the hub of the railway system in Central Europe; Cologne, a natural crossing of the Rhine and a link with the invaded countries, has been continually bombed with success.

Railway traffic that normally only took eight hours to deal with has needed a week to clear.

Road transport systems are not so important, and not profitable targets unless choked with military convoys or troops. The R. A. F. maintains a watch on the roads collecting information about troop movements, but except for occasional attacks on bridges or major crossroads, they are not often bombed.

## FEW SEA COMMUNICATIONS.

Sea communications, except in the Baltic, and slight coastal traffic between ports in occupied countries, no longer exist for Germany. What little there is however is constantly attacked by bombs and machine-gun fire, and by mine-laying from the air. In the Baltic many German ships have been sunk by mines, aud convoys are kept off the sea by night. **Mines in the Kiel canal have kept it shut for long periods.** The loss of the sea puts a heavy strain on the German railways ; for instance, they must now handle coal for Italy which was formally seaborne.

Air transport of necessity is being used more and more, but at the best it is an expensive and inefficient means of carrying heavy goods. The Junkers 52 aircraft is being put on floats and used for carrying supplies to certain parts of Norway. Communications there are often so poor that even petrol has had to be taken by air.

In this persistent offensive against communications material damage is considerable. Material damage, it is true, can be repaired in time. But time itself is a loss that the Germans can never recover. Supplies are held up. A blocked canal, a disorganised port, and a train that takes days over a journey that normally takes hours, are as much dead loss to Germany's war machine as when tons of oil are sent up in flames.

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## GERMAN INFILTRATION INTO ITALY.
## HOW PEOPLE EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS.
## "GIVE YOURSELVES UP AND SEE INDIA FOR NOTHING."
## "TO BE BETTER OFF WE MUST LOSE THE WAR."

THE latest reports reaching London on the German infiltration into Italy show the fate which the people's courage has averted for Yugoslavia These include : German Co-ordinating Commissions in all North Italian towns and representatives on almost all **industrial concerns ;** Germen technicians in the **aircraft and electrical industries** installed on a long-term basis under a system of alleged " exchanges "; German technicians in Italian **textile factories ;** Germans replacing Italians in the **telephone, telegraph and electricity** services in Rome ; rumours of Germans in **Banks and post offices ;** Germans in all

**ministries** in Rome, especially the service ministries (the tightening up of ration regulations at the beginning of the year was ascribed in Italy to German interference, and the German press ascribes the failure of the previous regulations to Italian bureaucratic incompetence); the **Gestapo** in the **police departments** in all main centres, and **German police in Rome** on the pretext of instruction in colonial practice.

Though unable as yet to overthrow their Germanophile rulers, the Italian people have their own way of expressing their views on German domination. A recent article by a neutral correspondent in the *Tablet* has some instructive examples. "It is astonishing how imprudently soldiers talk about events. One of my informers was sitting in a compartment where several Italian soldiers were talking. Some of them were going abroad and one of them said to his comrades 'So you're going to Africa? Well you know the trick. Just give yourselves up to the British. They won't do you any harm and you can perhaps see India for nothing.'"

Soldiers tell stories about the arrogant manners of German officers. In intellectual circles in Milan and also in industrial milieux, it is quite common to hear "Ci usano como lore scrape botte." ("They use us like old shoes.") It is known in Italy that people in German-occupied countries are not even allowed to listen to the Italian radio.

People openly accuse the Germans of being responsible for the food shortage. The usual conclusion heard in several towns, and one which seems to be a popular slogan is the following: "Per stare meglio in Italia bisogna che noi perdiamo questa guerra" (To be better off here in Italy we must lose the war). On some occasions, when confidence has been established, people added the remark: "I don't believe England will lose the war. England has the sympathy of the whole world, and Germany the hate of the whole world."

In several restaurants people have been speaking loudly against the Germans and against the régime. One person made quite a speech and people left their tables to listen. The general conclusion was this: "We must lose the war and get rid of Fascism." Other persons said "We should win the war, because otherwise we'll have a revolution." Everybody seems to agree on the necessity of a separate peace. In that case there is great fear of occupation by the Germans. In any case, if the Germans win, the Italians say, they will lose Fiume and Trieste.

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# WILL SEIZED SHIPS BE MERGED IN U. S. MERCHANT FLEET?

# PROBLEM OF TRANSPORT OF ARMS TO BRITAIN.

# CHANCE OF EXTENDING AMERICAN NEUTRALITY PATROL.

*The Washington Correspondent of the **Daily Telegraph** cabled on April 8:*

It is anticipated that **German and Italian ships will be incorporated into the American Merchant Marine thus releasing American ships for transfer to Britain.** Danish ships would in all probability be treated in the same way.

The decision to send to England such an important official as Mr. Forrestal as naval envoy has raised speculation that other matters involving broad questions of policy might also be taken up.

Colonel Knox stated that the Navy Department was handling the purchase of material in the United States for the British Navy and also undertaking repairs to British warships. "Efforts are being made very rapidly to establish a suitable uniformity of naval equipment. The object is to expedite purchases and repairs," he added.

A naval spokesman said that one of the chief purposes of the visit was to see if some method could be evolved by which United States' naval armaments and equipment could be used by the British Navy.

**One problem uppermost** in the minds of the Administration to-day is that of **securing the safe delivery of American armaments** at the battlefronts of the democracies. **This problem falls into two related but distinct categories: Provision of adequate merchant shipping tonnage to carry goods across the Atlantic and the formulation of a plan to give the shipping sufficient protection.**

The simplest method to provide protection would be to use American naval vessels to convoy supplies to points where they are needed. But politically the simplest solution is often the hardest.

The Administration believes that it can secure the protection of arms shipped to Europe without provoking a head-on collision with the Isolationists by ordering convoys. This could be done by * **extending the American Neutrality Patrol**, which is approved by all, and giving it more defined duties.

At present it only operates in the Pan-American Safety Zone, but could, without arousing much opposition, be extended to the limits of the Western Hemisphere, that is to say, to a line running midway between the bulges of Africa and South America.

[Since effected. Ed.]

Once the principle of taking active steps "to keep war from the Western Hemisphere" was established, its practical application could be worked out to fit in with the British convoy system.

**Shipping could be sent across the far northern route from American ports to Halifax, Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland, which are all within the Western Hemisphere. Vessels could, therefore, be protected by the Neutrality Patrol.**

The last leg of the journey, only 900 miles, would be made under British convoy. Despite the hazards of icebergs and distance, submarines might challenge the Neutrality Patrol, but without much chance of success.

The second half of the transportation problem is shipping space. This is now being discussed by British officials headed by Sir Arthur Salter and their American colleagues.

There is little doubt that American output will be speeded up, but the delivery of new vessels will not begin for a year.

Since every ton of shipping space saved during the next few months will be far more valuable than a ton saved a year hence, some move to provide better protection for existing tonnage may be expected very soon.

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# Examples of Misleading Statements in Enemy Broadcasts to India and the Near East for the period April 21—27, 1941.

## A.—BROADCASTS IN ENGLISH.

### DR. GOEBBELS AND THE BRICK WALL.

HOPEFULLY, persistently and quite vainly, Dr. Goebbels has tried throughout the week to make the world see a crack in the British Empire's solidarity. This particular rift, he would have us believe, exists between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and Great Britain on the other; and, to support his little theory, he has invented

(*a*) dissensions between British and Anzac troops actually in the Balkans,

(*b*) differences of opinion between the British and Anzac authorities at Headquarters in Cairo, and

(*c*) alarm and dissatisfaction among the Australian and New Zealand peoples themselves.

Nazi stories of quarrels between British and Anzac troops in Greece are put in their right perspective by the orderly, stubborn and highly successful rear-guard actions which the Empire forces there have been carrying out.

## STRANGE EVIDENCE OF "DIFFERENCES".

Obedient to its master's voice, the Rome radio chimed in on April 23 with an allegation that "serious differences of opinion had broken out between the commander of the British troops in the Middle East and the commander of the Australian troops in the same area."

**Unfortunately for Rome, it was officially announced from Cairo the very same day that General Sir Thomas Blamey, the Australian Commander-in-Chief, had been appointed second-in-command to the British generalissimo, Sir Archibald Wavell—who would hardly have taken this step had there been any differences at all between himself and his Australian colleague.**

## FIGHTING BRITAIN'S BATTLES.

A week ago Goebbels was screaming that the British were forcing the Greeks to fight Britain's battles; more recently, he has changed his tune to an accusation that General Wavell had sent only Anzac troops to Greece, while British troops were allowed to "shelter in Cairo".

Mr. Churchill's periodical reviews of the war have a happy knack of disposing of some of the more blatant of Goebbels' lies, and this is what the Premier said on Sunday about the proportion of British and Anzac troops in Greece:

"An important part of the mobile portion of the Army of the Nile was sent to Greece in fulfilment of our pledge. It happened that the divisions available and best suited to the task were from New Zealand and Australia, and only **about half the troops who took part in this dangerous episode came from the Mother Country.**"

## THE LIE-FACTORY WORKS OVERTIME.

For over a week India has been bombarded with German and Italian wireless stories of terrific Axis air attacks on "dense streams of transports" evacuating British forces from Greece, combined, of course, with extravagant claims of transport sinkings.

This line of propaganda seems to have been world-wide, for on April 25 the naval correspondent of the London *Times* had something to say about this lying campaign. On Monday, he says, one enemy communiqué claimed that six laden transports were sunk totalling 31,000 tons. The next day another communiqué claimed "seven ships sunk, totalling 27,000 tons, 12 more damaged, a large warship hit by a bomb in Suda Bay, etc." The climax of invention was reached on Wednesday, when the Nazis claimed to have killed 30,000 troops and thousands of bodies were stated to have been washed ashore.

As the *Times* expert comments, "this last story, thrown in no doubt as corroborative detail, betrays the falsity of the whole string of inventions.

For even if it were true that British transports had been sunk laden with British troops leaving Greece—though there is no reason to suppose it is true—**the enemy could not possibly have knowledge of bodies washed ashore", since at that time they did not occupy any shore on which such a thing could happen.**

## B.—BROADCASTS IN ASIATIC LANGUAGES.

### BASRA—AND BERLIN FANTASIES.

Referring to the landing of British and Indian troops in Basra, which was misrepresented as "the invasion of Iraq," Dr. Goebbels' Hindustani broadcast of Apr. 22 went on to add that it was customary with the British to invade other countries. **Actually these troops have been landed in Basra under the Anglo-Iraq treaty of 1930, which provides that should one of the parties be at war, the other party should come to her aid in the capacity of an ally, and provide all facilities and assistance in her power, including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes and means of communication.**

And as for the myth of Britain invading other countries, even Dr. Goebbels would be hard put to explain away the nature of the Nazi moves in Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Greece and Yugoslavia.

The Axis broadcasts continued to misrepresent the British move, and stated, on Apr. 23, that the Iraqi Government was protesting against what was quite erroneously characterised as an attack on the neutrality of Iraq. A communiqué issued by the Iraq Government, however, described these reports as quite unfounded. **It was pointed out that the British Government had sought permission for certain of its troops to pass through Iraq in conformity with the provisions of the Anglo-Iraq treaty, to which the Iraq Government had readily agreed.**

### ANOTHER NAZI LIE.

Berlin's Hindustani broadcast of Apr. 24 quoted comments by "military and political circles of the German capital" on the surrender of the Greek Armies on two fronts. These comments allege that "the British forces deserted the Greeks at a critical juncture". As to the Greeks isolated on the Thracian front, at no time did British forces occupy positions east of the Vardar valley, so there was no question of deserting their allies. **Incidentally, this army did not surrender as a whole; part of it has been evacuated by sea, with the aid of British naval power.**

The Greek soldiers in the Epirus sector of the Albanian front were reluctant to withdraw before Italians, over whom they had demonstrated their superiority again and again in the previous six months. They were outflanked by fast-moving German motorised columns, which prevented their withdrawal according to plan and forced them to surrender.

Finally, British forces in Greece were under the supreme command of General Papagos, Greek Commander-in-Chief.

# IMPORTANT NOTICE.

## WAR FILMS

The War Information Bureau have great pleasure in announcing that with the sanction and kind assistance of the Darbar their Lecturers will shortly be able to take round with them a series of Film programmes illustrative of the War in its various aspects.

These programmes consist in part of actual cinematography in war zones by the 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, and partially of cognate Indian subjects photographed by the organisation set up for the purpose by the Government of India, through the Bombay Government. There are three separate pictures in each programme, and the Bureau feel sure that they will prove a welcome addition to the lectures, and to the Weekly Bulletin.

The War Fund Entertainments Committee have been good enough to present the Bureau with a Station-wagon in which to convey the projectors, screens and films to the lecture centres, but in order to facilitate the working of the new lecture-programme necessary to provide some sixty centres in the State with a fresh cinema-show once every month, we particularly request the public of Pudukkottai to :—

(*a*) note that the usual time of the lecture will be **6.00** p. m. or **6.30** p. m. (as notified).

(*b*) **be absolutely punctual** at these lectures, since the War Information Bureau van will have to serve two centres on same evening.

Practical experience proves that at least one thousand persons can see these films with comfort, so when you hear of a Lecture announced for your village,

**COME........BUT BE PUNCTUAL.**

# PROGRAMME OF LECTURES

OF THE

## Pudukkottai State War Information Bureau.

1941—

### LECTURE XLIII.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| May | ...10, Saturday ... | Town Hall | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| | 11, Sunday ... | Kiranur | ... | 6.00 p. m. |
| | | Nanjur | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| | 12, Monday ... | Arimalam | ... | 6.00 p. m. |
| | | Kilanilaikottai | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| | 13, Tuesday ... | Perungalur | ... | 6.00 p. m. |
| | | Adanakkottai | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| | 14, Wednesday | Poovarasagudi | ... | 6.00 p. m. |
| | | Kilayur (south) | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| | 15, Thursday ... | Odayalippatti | ... | 6.00 p. m. |
| | | Killukottai | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| | 16, Friday ... | Nallur | ... | 6.00 p. m. |
| | | Mandaiyur | ... | 6.30 p. m. |

### LECTURE XLIV.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17, Saturday ... | Town Hall | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| 18, Sunday ... | Tiruvappur | ... | 5.00 p. m. |
| | Vayalogam | ... | 6.00 p. m. |
| | Kudumiamalai | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| 19, Monday ... | Nachandupatti | ... | 6.00 p. m. |
| | Virachilai | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| 20, Tuesday ... | Panayappatti | ... | 6.00 p. m. |
| | Rangiam | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| 21, Wednesday | Rajagiri | ... | 6.00 p. m. |
| | Viralimalai | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| 22, Thursday ... | Tirumayyam | ... | 6.00 p. m. |
| | Konapet | ... | 6.30 p. m. |
| 23, Friday ... | Puduppatti (Ponnamaravathi). | | 6.00 p. m. |
| | Vendampatti | ... | 6.30 p. m. |

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